The task-switching literature routinely conflates different operational definitions of switch cost, its predominant behavioral measure. This article is an attempt to draw attention to differences between the two most common definitions, alternating-runs switch cost (ARS) and explicit-cuing switch cost (ECS). ARS appears to include both the costs of switching tasks and the switch-independent costs specific to the first trial of a run, with the implication that it should generally be larger than ECS, but worse is that the alternating-runs procedure does not allow these costs to be separated. New data are presented to make these issues concrete, existing data are surveyed for evidence that ARS is larger than ECS, and implications of conflating these measures are examined for existing theoretical constructs.
The Problem: Two Different Operational Definitions The two most common task-switching procedures are explicit cuing and alternating runs. In the explicit-cuing procedure, a task cue is presented on every trial to indicate what task to perform on that trial. Cue selection is randomized, such that the task could switch from one trial to the next but could also repeat. Switch cost-explicit-cuing switch cost (ECS)-is measured simply by comparing switch trials with repeat trials.
In the alternating-runs procedure, in contrast, trials are grouped into predictable-length runs that alternate between tasks (e.g., AABBAABB . . .). The task (A or B) is cued by the position of the current trial within a run and usually also by the spatial location of the trial stimulus (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995) or other perceptual cue (Koch, 2003; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003) . Switch cost-alternating-runs switch cost (ARS)-is measured by comparing the trial in Position 1 of a run to the trial in Position 2. By design, this position variable (levels 1 and 2) correlates perfectly with the switching variable (levels switch and repeat) in that the Position 1 trial is the switch trial and the Position 2 trial is the repeat trial. Thus, whereas explicit cuing compares switch and repeat within Position 1 (there being no Position 2), alternating runs compares switch and repeat between Positions 1 and 2. A critical issue, of course, is whether this confounding of position and switching in the alternating-runs procedure is a mere technicality or whether there is reason to believe that position and switching both contribute to variance in this measure of switch cost.
For illustration of these two different switch-cost measures, an experiment was conducted by use of a hybrid design that combines central characteristics of the two procedures at issue. In this experiment, trials were grouped by task into predictable-length runs, as in alternating runs. However, a randomly selected task cue was presented just before the Position 1 trial, as in explicit cuing.
Thus, this design affords two measures of switch cost: One derived by comparing switch and repeat trials on Position 1 (comparable with ECS) and one derived by comparing Positions 1 and 2 on switch runs (comparable with ARS). This procedure also affords a measure of first-trial cost, which is the difference in performance between Positions 1 and 2 of repeat runs. First-trial cost is an index of processes that are deployed only on the first trial of a run and that are independent of whether the task switches. With respect to the alternating-runs procedure, the issue developed here is that ARS may well include first-trial cost as well as switch cost.
The present design also preserves a feature of many alternatingruns studies, which is a constant response-stimulus interval (RSI) between trials. A number of previous studies have demonstrated first-trial cost in a situation in which the RSI differs for Positions 1 and 2 (Allport & Wylie, 1999 Altmann, 2004a; Altmann & Gray, 2002; Gopher, Armony, & Greenshpan, 2000; Kramer, Hahn, & Gopher, 1999; Waszak et al., 2003) . For example, in Experiment 4 of Allport and Wylie's (2000) study, which was designed to probe first-trial cost, RSI before Position 1 was 2 s, whereas RSI between positions of a run was only 300 ms. Similarly, in Altmann's (2004a) study, RSI before Position 1 was 1 s, and RSI between positions within a run was zero. In these situations, first-trial effects could have emerged from the change in event timing between Positions 1 and 2 (Gopher et al., 2000) . Indeed, the term restart cost has been used to describe these effects, reflecting a hypothetical role for the pause coming before Position 1, which, although brief, could have put the system into some state from which it needs to be restarted. There is no such pause in many alternating-runs studies (e.g., Koch, 2005; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) , so to help make the case that ARS may include first-trial cost in these situations also, it was useful to show that first-trial cost can arise in a situation in which RSI is uniform between all trials.
Method

Participants
Fifteen Michigan State University undergraduate students participated in exchange for credit toward a course requirement. Two additional participants were excluded from analysis because their overall accuracy was below 90%.
Materials
Task cues and trial stimuli were taken from a recent alternatingruns study (Koch, 2005) . A task cue was a square (indicating the parity task) or diamond (indicating the magnitude task), unfilled and 3.8 cm on a side, presented in white in the center of a dark computer display. A trial stimulus was a digit from the set 1 to 9 excluding 5, presented with a height of 0.8 cm, also in white in the center of the display (surrounded by the task cue). The parity task was to judge whether the trial stimulus was even or odd, and the magnitude task was to judge whether the trial stimulus was higher or lower than 5. The Z and ?/ keys of a QWERTY keyboard were used to respond to both tasks. Response-to-key mapping was randomized between participants.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in sessions lasting roughly 30 min. A session began with online instructions and a practice block with the experimenter present to answer questions and continued with 10 regular blocks. Each block contained 60 trials and was followed by online feedback and a chance to rest. The feedback asked participants to be more accurate if the block score was below 90% and to be faster if the block score was 100%.
A trial began with onset of a trial stimulus and ended with the participant's response. A task cue appeared every other trial and remained visible until the response for that trial. The subsequent uncued trial was governed by the same task, meaning that trials were grouped by task into runs of two. The RSI was 1,000 ms, and the cue-stimulus interval (CSI) was 100 ms, also as in Koch's (2005, Experiments 2 and 3 ) study. The screen flashed after an error, adding 400 ms after error trials.
Task cues were randomly selected subject to the constraint that at most three repeat cues could occur in a row (as in Koch, 2005) . Trial stimuli were randomly selected subject to the constraint that immediate and lag-two repetitions were not allowed.
Design and Analysis
The practice block and the first trial of remaining blocks were excluded from analysis. Error trials and trials following error trials were excluded from latency analysis. Latencies were trimmed by taking medians. Latencies and errors were examined with a 2 (run type: switch, repeat) ϫ 2 (position in run: 1, 2) analysis of variance. Task (parity, magnitude) was included in the analysis, but its effects are not reported. Various simple-effects analyses of variance were used to examine the costs labeled in Figure 1 .
Results
The latency results appear in In terms of the costs labeled in Figure 1 , the ARS analog was reliable, as reflected in a simple effect of position on switch runs, F(1, 14) ϭ 24.5, p Ͻ .001, MSE ϭ 46,517. The ECS analog was also reliable, as reflected in a simple effect of run type on Position 1, F(1, 14) ϭ 10.1, p ϭ .007, MSE ϭ 13,955. Finally, first-trial cost was reliable, as reflected as a simple effect of position on repeat runs, F(1, 14) ϭ 14.2, p ϭ .002, MSE ϭ 34,949.
Error rates were 2.47% on Position 1 switch, 2.78% on Position 1 repeat, 2.01% on Position 2 switch, and 2.29% on Position 2 repeat. There were no main effects of run type or position on error rates, and there was no interaction ( ps Ͼ .182).
Discussion
The data in Figure 1 illustrate, in the context of this hybrid procedure, the distinctions raised above between ARS and ECS. Of particular interest is the first-trial cost incurred on Position 1 of a repeat run, which is almost exactly the difference between the quantities representing analogs of ARS and ECS. This first-trial cost represents a measure of whatever processes are triggered on the first trial of a run but are not related to switching tasks. Any such cost incurred in an alternating-runs study will be included when Position 2 is subtracted from Position 1 to compute ARS.
These results also show that first-trial cost can arise in a situation in which event timing, in particular the RSI, is equal for all trials, which is often the case in alternating-runs studies (e.g., Koch, 2005; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) . Thus, it now seems difficult to argue that first-trial costs will be absent from ARS as long as the particular implementation of alternating runs uses uniform event timing.
Although these results suggest that first-trial cost contributes to ARS, they are only indirect evidence that it does, because this procedure is not actually alternating runs. This lack of direct evidence reflects not so much a deficit in the present hybrid procedure but a deeper structural limitation of the alternating-runs procedure, which is that it has no repeat run that would allow such evidence to be developed, one way or the other. Without a repeat run, there is no way to estimate first-trial cost as in Figure 1 and no way to compute switch cost net of first-trial cost by comparing a Position 1 repeat trial with a Position 1 switch trial. The implication is that if a given manipulation in an alternating-runs study affects ARS in some way, it is impossible to know whether this manipulation is having its effect on first-trial processes, on switchrelated processes, or on both. The further and perhaps surprising implication is that despite the deep roots of the alternating-runs procedure in the task-switching domain (Fagot, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) , it offers little leverage on the question of what processes cause switch cost, which from the outset has been the predominant question in this literature. The explicit-cuing procedure does not have this problem, because ECS is computed within position, which, as operationalized here in terms of predictablelength runs, is always simply 1.
That said, any procedure will have its drawbacks, and explicitcuing is no exception. Indeed, there is a line of work premised on the notion that ECS itself is confounded because the cost of switching tasks is entangled with the cost of switching task cues, with an attendant theoretical proposal that task-switch cost reduces simply to cue-switch cost (Logan & Bundesen, 2003 . This theoretical proposal itself is weak (Altmann, in press; Mayr, 2006; Monsell & Mizon, 2006 ; see also Forstmann, Brass, & Koch, in press) , and the confounding of task switching and cue switching is actually present in any task-switching procedure that involves task cues, including alternating runs. However, a more easily detectable problem with explicit cuing, which is not necessarily shared by alternating runs, is that it does not allow cue-related processing to be separated from processing that starts with onset of the trial stimulus. Thus, for example, explicit-cuing studies alone cannot tell us whether manipulations of the CSI before a trial affect only cue-related processing, as at least one model implies (Logan & Bundesen, 2003 or whether they also affect later stages like stimulus encoding or response selection. To develop evidence on this point, uncued trials need to be included in the procedure, implying a run structure of some sort, and indeed, in an experiment similar to the one reported here in which CSI before Position 1 was manipulated, both Position 2 and Position 1 were affected, suggesting that cue encoding was not the only process that changed (Altmann, in press ). The larger point is that these and any similar issues that might emerge as we refine our understanding of procedures for studying cognitive control are important but separate from the issue addressed here, which is an under-appreciated problem with the alternating-runs procedure that the explicit-cuing procedure does not share.
Evidence That One Switch Cost Is Larger Than the Other
Even if the alternating-runs procedure, lacking repeat runs, does not afford a direct test of whether ARS includes a first-trial component, one can still approach the question indirectly. This section first develops a theoretical case that a functional adaptation could produce first-trial cost in the alternating-runs procedure, then reviews empirical data at two different levels-closely-matched comparisons of the two procedures and unmatched comparisonssuggesting that ARS is in fact larger than ECS, which is the prediction if ARS spans a process that ECS does not.
A Theoretical Perspective
Given a situation in which trials are predictably grouped into runs, consider the possibility that the cognitive system exploits this regularity by opting to process the task cue on the first trial of a run-whatever the cue, switch or repeat-in some way that it does not process task cues on later trials of the run. The function of this first-trial process might be to encode (Altmann, 2002) or retrieve (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000 a mental representation of the current task, which could then serve the system for the duration of that run, until the next run starts. Such a first-trial strategy, whatever its specific processing details, could have benefits even if, as assumed here, all trials, and not just the first of a run, are accompanied by task cues. For example, it would save having to establish the relevant mental representation anew on every trial. It would also, by virtue of applying to switch cues and repeat cues alike, spare the system a decision process that would otherwise be necessary to distinguish whether the current cue represents a different task than the one performed on the previous trial.
If a first-trial strategy like this were deployed when trials are grouped into alternating runs, not just when trials are grouped into randomized runs, then at least some of ARS would reflect first-trial cost, plus any additional cost arising because Position 1 happens to be a switch trial. This would be true even if a first-trial strategy was deployed only stochastically within a given study, by some participants on all trials, all participants on some trials, or some other combination. (As hinted above, an alternate strategy available in the typical alternating-runs procedure, in which every trial is accompanied by an external cue, would be to acquire task information anew from the cue on every trial.) If the aggregate data from a given study include any meaningful proportion of runs on which the system deployed a first-trial strategy, then ARS for that study will include some first-trial cost, as well as the cost of switching tasks (the Position 1 trial also being a switch trial). Thus, to have confidence that ARS contains no first-trial cost, one would need to develop evidence that such a strategy was, in effect, never used. This is a high burden that no extant alternating-runs study can be said to have met. A conservative conclusion would therefore be that ARS, as commonly reported in alternating-runs studies, includes some amount of first-trial cost linked to at least stochastic use of a first-trial strategy.
This analysis suggests that a cleaner implementation of the alternating-runs procedure would be to present a task cue only on the first trial of a run, as in the experiment reported earlier, rather than cuing every trial. The original motivation for cuing every trial was to helpfully relieve the experimental participant of the need to carry the task in memory (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) , but of course this does not prevent the system from carrying the task in memory, if this happens to be the more efficient strategy (e.g., Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006) . In general, there is no way to prevent use of memory short of inducing appropriate lesions, and indeed a fact of life is that we often use memory to store information (like access codes or phone numbers) because this affords fast access. In effect, then, helpfully relieving the participant of the need to carry a memory load unhelpfully relieves the analyst of any control over where the participant stores information about the current task. Cuing only the first trial of a run would limit the strategic choices available to participants and thus make at least Position 2 latencies, for example, interpretable in terms net of perceptual task-related operations.
Empirical Evidence From Closely Matched Experiments
From an empirical angle, there is in fact a circumstantial case that ARS is generally larger than ECS, consistent with the proposal that ARS includes some amount of first-trial cost. The case can only be circumstantial because the two procedures are fundamentally different in ways that may affect the cost of switching tasks. The most salient difference may be the predictability of tasks in the alternating-runs procedure, which should largely eliminate any effects of task uncertainty from trial to trial and may facilitate anticipatory processing for pending trials in a way that the explicitcuing procedure cannot. Certainly the probability of a task switch is known to affect performance (e.g., Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002; Monsell & Mizon, 2006) , and this is roughly one half in the typical explicit-cuing procedure but either zero or one on different trials in the alternating-runs procedure. Despite these procedural differences, however, there is no harm in probing performance differences between alternating-runs and explicit-cuing procedures, and four studies to date have done so.
In the first study, Tornay and Milan (2001) reported three experiments comparing the two procedures. In their Experiments 1 and 2, there appears to have been no interaction of the procedure variable (alternating runs vs. explicit cuing) with switching (switch vs. repeat). However, in their Experiment 3, in which slightly longer runs were used in the alternating-runs procedure, ARS did in fact seem to be larger than ECS. Figure 2 shows these results. The solid line shows the alternating-runs (predictable) condition, and the dashed line shows the explicit-cuing (random) condition. The abscissa shows a generalized position variable that drops the predictability constraint to accommodate a comparison between predictable runs in the alternating-runs procedure and randomly occurring runs in the explicit-cuing procedure (the relevance of distinguishing these two kinds of runs is addressed later in this section). ARS is simply the difference, along the solid line, between shift trials and first repetition. ECS is the difference, along the dashed line, between shift trials and an average of first repetition and second repetition, weighted toward the former because of the lower binomial probability of reaching two repeat trials in a row. Comparing these representations of ARS and ECS, it seems reasonably clear that ARS is larger, and although no statistics involving the switching variable (switch vs. repeat) were reported for this experiment, the interaction of the procedure and general- In a second study, Monsell, Sumner, and Waters (2003) reported one experiment that compared alternating runs with explicit cuing. The results of their Experiment 2 appear in Figure 3 . Here, the alternating-runs (predictable) condition appears in the left panels, and the explicit-cuing (random) condition appears in the right panels. The different lines represent different intervals (in milliseconds) separating the response on one trial from onset of the stimulus for the next trial (this is the RSI). The abscissa again shows the generalized position variable that drops the predictability constraint to accommodate explicit-cuing runs. ARS is the difference, along each line in the upper left panel, between the 1 and 2 bins on the abscissa. ECS is the difference, along each line in the upper right panel, between the 1 bin on the abscissa and an average of the 2, 3, and 4 bins, weighted toward the 2 bin. Within each RSI, but most dramatically for the 50 condition, ARS was again larger than ECS. Statistics involving the switching variable (switch vs. repeat) were not reported, but the interaction between the procedure (alternating runs vs. explicit cuing) and position in run variables was again reliable, F(3, 33) ϭ 9.77, p Ͻ .001.
In a third study, Milan, Sanabria, Tornay, and Gonzalez (2005) also reported one experiment that compared alternating runs with explicit cuing. The results of their Experiment 1 appear in Figure  4 , in a format similar to Figure 2 . ARS is the difference, along the solid (predictable) line, between the 0 and 1 bins on the abscissa. ECS is the difference, along the dotted (random) line, between the 0 bin on the abscissa and an average of the 1 and 2 bins, weighted toward the 1 bin. ARS was larger than ECS, and although statistics involving switching (switch vs. repeat) were not reported, the interaction between the variables shown in Figure 4 was again reliable, F(2, 34) ϭ 7.96, p Ͻ .01.
In all three studies discussed above, the original aim was to compare predictable runs in an alternating-runs condition with randomly-occurring runs in an explicit-cuing condition, the latter collected by finding unpredicted runs in the data post hoc. For present purposes, the relevance of this difference between conditions lies in the difference in opportunities afforded the cognitive system. Under the theoretical perspective developed earlier, predictable-length runs should allow the system to save itself some processing on later trials of a run by setting up a functional representation of the current task on the first trial and then using this for the duration of the run. Such a strategy would produce confounds in ARS, as developed earlier. In explicit cuing, however, there are no predictable runs to exploit, so one might expect the system to treat every trial somewhat like a first trial. This in turn predicts that Positions 2 and later in an explicit-cuing run should incur longer latencies than Positions 2 and later in an alternating-runs run. This is empirically the case in at least Figures 3 and 4 (with little difference between the conditions in Figure 2 ). The story may be more complicated, however, given the trend for latencies to decrease across an explicit-cuing run, as seen particularly in Figure 3 (right panel; see also Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000) . This trend could reflect facilitation of cue-related processing by repetition priming (e.g., Altmann, 2005; Sohn & Anderson, 2001) , if this happens to build up over successive cue repetitions, or conceivably an effect of a lengthening streak of repeated events within a randomized event stream (Altmann & Burns, 2005) , or some other mechanism. The details of whatever explanation emerges may suggest that the repeat trial in some particular position of a randomly occurring run is the best estimate of the offset of switch-related processes in explicit cuing, which in turn would make it important, for present purposes, to check whether differences between ARS and a revised ECS still stand. In purely procedural terms, however, the best match for the Position 2 trial used to compute ARS is the Position 2 trial of an explicit-cuing run, which would produce the smallest ECS (see Figure 3) and thus the largest difference between ARS and ECS.
Finally, in a fourth study that undertook a different kind of comparison between the two procedures, Koch (2005) reported three experiments in each of which participants performed the first five blocks under one procedure, switched to the other procedure for the sixth block, then switched back to the original procedure for a seventh block. In his Experiments 1 and 2, in which the first and last procedure was alternating runs, the switch in between to explicit cuing produced no reliable change in switch cost. However, in his Experiment 3, in which the first and last procedure was explicit cuing, the switch in between to alternating runs did in fact produce an increase in switch cost, F(1, 15) ϭ 11.8, p Ͻ .05.
The generalization across these four studies is that, in all cases in which ARS and ECS differed reliably, ARS was larger, supporting the notion that ARS includes components that ECS does not. 
Empirical Evidence From Unmatched Experiments
Apart from these few closely-matched comparisons of alternating runs and explicit cuing, both procedures are popular, and many studies have been published using one or the other. Therefore, if ARS is on balance larger than ECS, this difference should manifest in a sufficiently large unmatched-samples comparison. Table 1 shows the results of such an analysis. Studies selected for inclusion were those involving healthy adults, in which cues were mapped one-to-one to tasks (see Altmann, in press) and in which there was a manipulation of the CSI between onset of the task cue and onset of the subsequent trial stimulus. This last criterion was adopted from another meta-analysis (Altmann, 2004b) simply to produce a tractable sample size here, but it also happens to control nicely for CSI duration, which was nearly equal for the two sets of studies (608 vs. 605 ms). (This control is relevant because CSI is often cited as modulating switch cost, at least as switch cost is construed in, e.g., Logan, 2003; Monsell, 2003; see Altmann, 2004b , for a review of contrary evidence.) Mean ARS across studies was 172 ms, and mean ECS was 94 ms, F(1, 32) ϭ 14.2, p ϭ .001, MSE ϭ 3,486.
Available empirical evidence, then, both from studies that match the two procedures as closely as possible and from a broader survey of studies that each use one procedure or the other, suggests that ECS spans less processing than ARS-that subtracting repeat trials from switch trials in explicit cuing cancels processing costs that subtracting Position 2 trials from Position 1 trials in alternating runs does not. The remaining question is whether this matters-whether, after a dozen years of task switching (in the modern era) and hundreds of studies, it may nonetheless be worthwhile now to adopt a greater degree of precision in discussing switch costs.
Implications: Failure-to-Engage and Stimulus Priming Accounts of . . . What?
To summarize, the basic issue is that ARS and ECS have different operational definitions, with the contrast sharpened by conceptualizing ARS as ECS plus any first-trial costs (see Figure  1) . The deeper methodological problem for ARS is that the alternating-runs procedure affords no way to disentangle switchrelated processes from switch-independent, first-trial related processes. The reaction to these issues in the task-switching community will surely range from boredom to irritation. On one hand, much of the procedural detail is in some sense obvious, and studies have been published comparing the two procedures, so some attention has been paid. On the other hand, everyone in the community (myself included) has at one point or another referred to these two measures interchangeably in framing research questions or results or in captioning existing findings, so we all stand accused of some methodological sloppiness. Is it possible, therefore, to point to specific examples where such conflation has cost us something, to illustrate the common interest in greater precision?
Three examples are offered here, the first two involving important constructs that are difficult to interpret because almost all the relevant data were collected with the alternating-runs procedure. The first line of work involves the failure-to-engage hypothesis and its predictions concerning variance in response latencies (De Jong, 2000; De Jong, Berendsen, & Cools, 1999; Lien, Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2005; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002) . The empirical finding is that, at long CSIs, fast responses on switch trials are as fast as the fastest responses on repeat trials, but slow responses on switch trials are much slower than the slowest responses on repeat trials. This pattern is consistent with a reconfiguration process that has work to do on switch trials (Monsell, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and either completes this work during a long CSI, if it can engage in a timely fashion, or engages only after stimulus onset, in which case the time to do the work is charged to response latency. Mixing the two types of trials-those in which reconfiguration completes during the CSI and those in which reconfiguration only starts after stimulus onset-explains the empirical pattern in terms of some switches costing no extra response latency and others costing the full amount of reconfigu- ration time. These studies were all framed in terms of a reconfiguration perspective on cognitive control. Yet, because they all used alternating runs, their switch trials were also Position 1 trials, and their repeat trials were also Position 2 trials, so they equally well support a model in which the functional processes that engage during some CSIs but not others are those that execute on the first trial of a run-any run, switch or repeat. Thus, despite how it has been framed, the failure-to-engage hypothesis may well turn out to be an important element of a model in which the processes that implement cognitive control have nothing to do with switching tasks.
The second example is a line of work that characterizes switch cost as a consequence of negative effects of stimulus priming. The basic finding is that performance in response to new stimuli, namely those that have never been used together with the competing task, is better than performance in response to old stimuli, namely those that have been used together with the competing task (Allport & Wylie, 2000, Experiment 5; Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2005) . In these studies, a stimuluspriming effect registered on Position 1 of a switch run when switching was from a picture-naming task to a word-reading task (and registered on all positions when switching was in the other direction). However, because these results were gathered by use of alternating runs, with no repeat runs interleaved, they are silent on whether this effect on Position 1 reflected changes in switching processes or changes in first-trial processes. More recently, one explicit-cuing study has linked stimulus priming to an increase in ECS (Koch & Allport, 2006 ) but also reported a main effect on response latency. To know whether this main effect reflected a change in first-trial processes, one would need to reproduce it using randomized runs, which would allow a test of the effect on first-trial cost (see Figure 1) .
The third example concerns the four aging studies included in Table 1 . In the three that used alternating runs (De Jong, 2001; Kramer et al., 1999; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000) , differences in ARS between young and older adults were 159 ms, 282 ms, and (a nonsignificant) 80 ms, respectively. In the one that used explicit cuing (Bojko, Kramer, & Peterson, 2004) , the difference in ECS was a smaller (also nonsignificant) 33 ms. Were it not for the "switching" terminology used in the first three studies, they might suggest that first-trial costs, not task-switch costs, were what increased with age, which could lead to very different guidance from these studies about which mechanisms to target in future cognitive-aging studies.
These three examples do not reflect an exhaustive search, so there may be others, given that the alternating-runs procedure was present at the inception of the modern task-switching era (Fagot, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and remains in use today (e.g., Lien et al., 2005; Taube-Schiff & Segalowitz, 2005; Waszak et al., 2005) . However, what they may suffice to show is that precision in reporting and discussion of switch cost is not just good in principle, in a domain broadly concerned with this construct, but is a prerequisite for developing empirical results like those sketched above into diagnostically useful constraints on models of cognitive control.
Summary
The aim here has been to draw attention to a difference in how switch cost is operationally defined in the two most common task-switching procedures-a difference that in the literature is generally ignored, even in integrative surveys (e.g., Logan, 2003; Monsell, 2003) . ARS is derived through comparison of Positions 1 and 2 of switch runs and thus may include costs specific to the first trial of a run as well as costs of switching tasks. Whether it does or not cannot be tested directly, because the alternating-runs procedure affords no Position 1 repeat trial that would cancel such costs when used as a baseline. Nonetheless, if there is a realistic possibility that performance in a context of predictable-length runs involves a first-trial strategy of some kind, in which whatever cue is presented at the start of a run is generically transformed into an internal task representation that governs until its relevance expires, then first-trial costs cannot be ruled out, and ARS should be treated with caution, as a confounded measure. In contrast, ECS is derived by comparing switch trials and repeat trials with no position confound, such that any costs specific to the first trial of a predictablelength run-a run of length 1, in this instance-cancel in the comparison; explicit-cuing has shortcomings of its own, but at least it does not suffer a structural confound between effects of switching tasks and effects of position within a predictable-length run.
This analysis makes a prediction-that ARS should in general be larger than ECS-that is supported by available empirical evidence from the few studies that have compared the two procedures under relatively controlled circumstances and from a broader survey of unmatched studies. It also suggests that one would need to elaborate at least two lines of work in the task-switching domain, one on the failure-to-engage hypothesis and the other on the negative effects of stimulus priming, using a randomized-runs procedure to identify whether effects reported in the original studies were switch-related or first-trial related. More generally, this analysis suggests that it would be useful to start acknowledging that ARS and ECS have different operational definitions, rather than citing them together as if they are identical measures, as is currently the standard (e.g., Logan, 2003; Monsell, 2003) .
